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CARDIAC CLAIMS UNDER CALIFORNIA'S
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
The most recent statistics published by the American Heart Asso-
ciation,1 although somewhat encouraging, still highlight the magnitude
of cardiovascular disease as a national health problem. In 1967, the
last year for which statistics are available, cardiovascular diseases ac-
counted for more than 54 percent of deaths from all causes.2 Moreover,
it is estimated that more than 27 million Americans are living with
some form of cardiovascular illness.3 Mortality projections show that
88,400 persons in California alone will die in 1970 as a result of cardio-
vascular disease,4 and it is currently estimated that 1,333,000 Cali-
fornians over the age of 20 suffer from some form of heart disease. 5
Alleged Inadequacy of California Compensation Laws
These staggering statistics have generated anxiety among em-
ployers and insurance carriers over the potential impact of heart claims
upon workmen's compensation. This is certainly true in California,
where a general consensus exists among employers that the current
workmen's compensation provisions are inadequate to fairly determine
whether a particular heart attack is or is not industrially connected.'
Industry spokesmen assert that if present statutory provisions continue'
to be applied in determining compensability, a great majority of those
Californians between 25 and 65 years of age who suffer from some
type of heart disease are potential recipients of workmen's compensa-
tion benefits.7 Even the California Heart Association has expressed
the belief that under present criteria, "the number of heart attacks
and other cardiovascular problems which could be judged industrial
1. AMERICAN HEART ASS'N, HERT FACTS (PR-33, 1970).
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 4.
5. Id. at 5.
6. See, e.g., Letter from Edmund D. Leonard, General Counsel for California
Self-Insurers Association, to George Zenovich, Chairman of the Assembly Interim
Committee on Finance and Insurance, Jan. 27, 1966; Letter from Christina J. New,
Deputy City Attorney of Los Angeles, to the Assembly Interim Committee on
Finance and Insurance, Jan. 26, 1966; Letter from Jack D. Wickware, Assistant Coun-
sel for the League of California Cities, to the California Workmen's Compensation
Study Commission, Nov. 30, 1964.
7. CALIFORNIA WOREMEN'S COMPENSATION STUDY COMM'N, INTERim REPORT
ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 3 (1966) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
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would. . . be tremendous."'
Under California Labor Code section 3600, the primary condi-
tions of compensability are met where "at the time of the injury, the
employee is performing service growing out of and incidental to his
employment and is acting within the course of his employment,"9 and
where "the injury is proximately caused by the employment, either with
or without negligence."" ° The term "injury" includes "any injury or
disease arising out of the employment . . ... 11 Under this definition,
heart disease has long been recognized as a compensable injury. 12
It is contended that such standards render it virtually impossible
for an employer to disprove work connection," and as a result, many
cardiac episodes that are merely the culmination of preexisting heart
disease are receiving compensation. Moreover, employers allege that
difficulty in disproving work connection has forced them to settle a
substantial number of heart claims by compromise and release agree-
ments. 4 For fiscal year 1968, for instance, almost 54 percent of
cardiac claims before the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board 5
were compromised.' 6
A large part of the dissatisfaction of employers and insurance
carriers with the present standards can be attributed to financial con-
siderations. A significant rise in the number of heart claim awards will
naturally result in increased premium rates. For those employers who
elect to self-insure,' 7 the financial consequences of having to bear the
8. CALIFORNIA HEART ASS'N, HEART DISEASE AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
7 (1964) [hereinafter cited as HEART DISEASE].
9. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600(b).
10. Id. § 3600(c).
11. Id. § 3208.
12. See, e.g., G.L. Eastman Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 186 Cal. 587, 200
P. 17 (1921).
13. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 3.
14. Id.
15. CAL. LABOR CODE § 53, operative Jan. 15, 1966, eliminated the Industrial
Accident Commission. The Commission's functions were transferred, for the most
part, to the newly created Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board. Thus, prior to
January 15, 1966, the cases will refer to the "Commission." Post January 15, 1966,
cases refer to either the "Board" or "Appeals Board."
16. DIVISIoN OF LABOR STATISTICS AND RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ORIGINAL DECISIONS ISSUED AND BENEFITS AWARDED IN
HEART DISEASE CASES BEFORE THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, FISCAL
YEARS 1963-68 [hereinafter cited as LABOR STATISTICS].
17. Under CAL. LABOR CODE § 3700, every employer, except the state and
political subdivisions or institutions thereof, must secure the payment of compensation
through insurers authorized to write compensation insurance in California; or an em-
ployer may obtain a certificate of consent to self-insure, which may be issued upon
proof of ability to self-insure and to pay any compensation that may become due.
Employers who do not self-insure, and who do not wish to insure with an authorized
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full costs of numerous awards could be disastrous.
Apart from self-insurance, the compensation insurance system in
California operates, for the most part, in the following manner. The
insurance commissioner is charged with the responsibility of classifying
risks and establishing the statewide premium rates for workmen's com-
pensation insurance.18  The classification of risks is based mainly upon,
although not limited to, the degree of hazard involved in the various
occupations, businesses, and industries. The premium rates established
correspond to the various risk classifications, and are usually expressed
in amounts per $100 of the payroll for a particular classification. 9
These rates are normally revised annually on the basis of data com-
piled from the two preceding policy years. If such statistics disclose an
increase or decrease in the ratio of work-injury payments to premiums,
the rates will be revised accordingly."0
Inasmuch as premium rates are adjusted according to the state-
wide "experience" in a particular classification, an increase in heart
awards may not significantly raise the premium rate for any individual
employer. Moreover, the employer who keeps work-injury losses to a
level below that of the statewide average may be able to reduce his in-
surance costs under the "merit rating" provision of the California Insur-
ance Code.2 This provision allows the insurance commissioner to ap-
prove a system of merit rating in which the compensation experience of
a particular insured is used as a factor in raising or lowering his prem-
ium rates, thereby encouraging an employer to keep his injury losses to
a minimum.
Fundamental Causation Issue
Financial considerations, while of prime importance to employers,
are nevertheless merely symptomatic in relation to the underlying prob-
lem. Basically, the discontent of employers and insurance carriers with
the present standards, as applied to heart claims, involves the fundamen-
tal issue of causation. It is felt that as a consequence of judicial inter-
pretation, the employee's burden of establishing proximate cause22 has
become progressively lighter, and has now reached a point where em-
private insurance carrier, may obtain insurance from the California Compensation
Insurance Fund. CAL. INS. CODE § 11775. This fund provides California employers
with the opportunity to obtain compensation insurance at cost.
18. CAL. INS. CODE § 11732.
19. Riesenfeld, Efficacy and Costs of Workmen's Compensation, 49 CAr. L.
REV. 631, 646 (1961).
20. 1 W. HANNA, CA.irFomiA LAw oF EMPLOYEE IlNuRES AND WORMEsN'S
COMi'ENSATION § 2.06(8) (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as HANNA].
21. CAL. INS. CODE § 11732.
22. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 2d 555, 559,
166 P.2d 908, 911 (1946) (employee has the burden of establishing proximate cause).
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ployment causation is established if the employee simply happened to be
at work when the heart attack occurred. 23 To illustrate this progression,
in Truck Insurance Exchange v. Industrial Accident Commission,2" the
court stated that in considering whether an injury arose out of and
was proximately caused by the employment, common law rules of proxi-
mate cause, decisive in tort cases, are not applicable to questions of
workmen's compensation, and that "reasonable doubts as to whether
an injury is compensable are to be resolved in favor of the employee."25
Then, in Colonial Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,26
the court held that the causal connection between the employment and
the injury need only be a contributory cause.27  This principle is re-
flected by the numerous decisions allowing recovery where the em-
ployment only accelerated or aggravated a preexisting heart condition.28
Indeed, one authority has concluded that the judiciary has rendered the
proximate cause requirement a dead letter in California's workmen's
compensation law, and that it is now legally sufficient if there is merely
coincidence between the employment and the injury.29
The medical aspect of causation has also contributed to employer
dissatisfaction with the present standards of compensating heart claims.
Medical testimony is, of course, necessary to establish a causal connection
between the employment and the heart condition, for "where the sub-
ject matter is within the exclusive knowledge of experts trained in a sci-
entific subject, expert evidence is essential." 30
A major problem, however, is the general inadequacy of present
medical knowledge concerning the causative factors of heart disability
and death.' Consequently, conflicting medical testimony is frequently
encountered by the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board in heart
cases. Some medical experts will testify that physical strain has no
harmful effect upon a preexisting heart condition. Other physicians,
equally qualified, will express the opposite view. 2 As might be ex-
23. See CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3212, 3212.2, 3212.5-.7, regarding the statutory
presumption of employment causation applied to heart claims of policemen, firemen and
various other state civil service officers and employees.
24. 27 Cal. 2d 813, 167 P.2d 705 (1946).
25. Id. at 816, 167 P.2d at 706.
26. 29 Cal. 2d 79, 172 P.2d 884 (1946).
27. Id. at 83, 172 P.2d at 887.
28. See, e.g., Reynolds Elec. & Eng'r Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 65
Cal. 2d 438, 421 P.2d 102, 55 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1966); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v.
Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 235 Cal. App. 2d 567, 48 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1965).
29. 2 HANNA § 8.03(5)(b).
30. City & County of San Francisco v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 117 Cal. App.
2d 455, 459, 256 P.2d 81, 83 (1953).
31. See HEART DISEASE, supra note 8, at 4.
32. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 2d 555,
560, 166 P.2d 908, 911 (1946).
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pected, this has resulted in the rendering of what would appear to be
opposite findings by the referee upon almost identical facts and opin-
ions, depending upon what medical view is persuasive in a given case.33
Thus, employers complain that in many cases a claimant merely
has to locate a doctor, often the claimant's family physician, who will
testify to the effect that the cardiac disability was industrially caused, in
order to overcome the testimony of other physicians and independent
medical examiners that the injury was nonindustrial.3 4 Moreover, it is
alleged that the frequent conflict in medical testimony is almost in-
variably resolved in favor of the claimant because of Labor Code section
3202, which provides that the law of workmen's compensation "shall
be liberally construed by the courts with the purpose of extending
[its] benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of
employment."
Since proximate cause is a question of fact to be resolved by the
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, 5 the anxiety of employers
over cardiac claims is further exacerbated by Labor Code section 5953,
which states that "the findings and conclusions of the [board] on
questions of fact are conclusive and final and not subject to review."
Thus, if an employer loses a case at the board level, he feels that
there is little to be gained in seeking a writ of review.
From the employer's standpoint, it appears that legally, it is
sufficient if the employment is merely a cause in fact of the injury.
Compensation, then, seems to turn upon the medical testimony alone,
which in the words of the California Heart Association, often supports
awards "based more on folklore than scientific facts."36
Demand for Minimum Legal or Medical Criteria
To avoid compensating cardiac incidents that result solely from
the natural progression of a preexisting heart disease, it is commonly
proposed that some test be established to guide the board and the
courts in determining the compensability of heart claims.37  The ma-
jority of proposed tests advocate the adoption of either minimum legal
or medical criteria, which must be met before compensation is awarded.
The desirability of adopting some minimum standard has not been
averred by employers and insurance carriers alone. From time to time
the judiciary has also echoed such sentiments. 88
33. Id.
34. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 41.
35. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc; Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 2d 555,
559, 166 P.2d 908, 911 (1946).
36. HEART DISEASE, supra note 8, at 8.
37. See notes 39, 48, 49, 58, 63 & accompanying text inIra.
38. See, e.g., Daniels v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 148 Cal. App. 2d 500, 503-04,
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Proposed Legal Tests
"Unusual Strain"
One proposed test for legal causation, that of "unusual strain," has
received new support.39  To come within this test, a claimant would
have to prove that his cardiac episode occurred as the result of some
physical exertion or mental strain that was greater than the exertion or
strain demanded in the performance of his normal duties. Only by
demonstrating this unusual strain could an employee overcome the in-
ference that his heart attack was due to natural causes. Should the
claimant satisfy this legal test of causation, to receive compensation he
would still have to show that, medically, the unusual strain adversely
affected his heart.
Originally, the "unusual strain" test was employed in a different
capacity, namely, to determine whether or not an injury was "accidental"
in those jurisdictions whose workmen's compensation laws only apply to
"accidental injuries."4 °  A claimant who incurred a heart attack
had to show that the precipitating exertion was unusual in comparison
to the exertion normally required by his regular duties. A cardiac
episode was not considered an accidental injury unless such a showing
of unusual exertion was made.
Although the vast majority of jurisdictions still require an injury
to be accidental in nature to come within workmen's compensation, 41
only a few states, when considering heart claims, continue to define
"accidental" in terms of unusual exertion. 42 In general, the remaining
jurisdictions now consider that exertion usual to one's employment as
sufficient to satisfy their "accident" requirement.43  California elimi-
nated the "accident" provision from its workmen's compensation law in
1915,44 two years after the Workmen's Compensation Act was passed. 45
Thus, California avoided the difficulties plaguing those jurisdictions re-
quired to find the accidental nature of a cardiac incident that was not
306 P.2d 905, 907 (1957).
39. See, e.g., 26 CIRCULATION 619, 620 (1962); COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 7, at 46.
40. IA A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORxMEN's COMPENSATION § 37.10 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as LARSON]. Only six states are listed that do not require a com-
pensable injury to be accidental in nature. They are: California, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Rhode Island and Texas.
41. See note 40 supra.
42. 1A LARSON § 38.30, at 551-59, listing Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Indiana,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota
and Washington.
43. 1A LARSON § 38.30, at 541-51.
44. Cal. Stats. 1915, ch. 607, § 2, at 1081.
45. Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 176, at 279.
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caused by direct trauma to the heart or chest.4"
Many criticisms of the "unusual strain" test as used to show an
"accidental" injury also apply to its utilization as a separate legal test
of causation. One major drawback is that it operates arbitrarily and
unfairly in that the comparison is with the exertion required by the
normal duties of an employee. Thus, should a household mover suffer
a heart attack while loading a piano, he would probably be denied
compensation because of the absence of "unusual" exertion. On the
other hand, suppose an office worker, whose regular duties involve little
physical exertion, incurs a heart attack while lifting a typewriter. His
chances of receiving compensation are excellent because he can show
"unusual" exertion.
"Wear and Tear of Life"
Suggested improvements upon the "unusual strain" test have dealt
mainly with the formulation of a single consistent norm of exertion for
all employees with which the precipitating exertion of a cardiac episode
can be compared. For instance, in a 1957 New York case, Burrs v.
Lewis,4 7 the court of appeals adopted what is commonly termed the
"wear and tear of life" test. The court, in clarifying an earlier de-
cision, which apparently eliminated any requirement of unusual exer-
tion, stated that the case nevertheless required "that the regular job
activity shall entail greater exertion than the ordinary wear and tear of
life . . ."I' Under this rule, the showing of unusual strain is not
determined by reference to the exertion involved in a claimant's regular
duties, but by comparison to the strain of the ordinary nonemployment
life of all persons. In other words, for the legal test of causation to be
satisfied, the strain must be greater than that encountered by everyone
in normal day-to-day living. If the medical testimony also supports a
causal connection between the employment exertion and the cardiac inci-
dent, compensation is awarded. Thus, the "wear and tear of life" test,
unlike the "unusual strain" test, has the obvious advantage of providing
a single norm that does not vary with the physical or mental demands of
a particular job.
"Actual Risk"
A somewhat similar proposal, the "actual risk" test, has also been
suggested as a rational standard of legal causation.49  In determining
46. See Wood, The Heart Attack Case in Workmen's Compensation, 16 AaK.
L Rnv. 214, 215-19 (1962).
47. 2 N.Y.2d 323, 141 N.E.2d 424, 160 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1957).
48. Id. at 326, 141 N.E.2d at 426, 160 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
49. Larson, The "Heart Cases" in Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and
Suggested Solution, 65 Mxcro L. Rav. 441, 470 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Heart
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compensability, this test takes into account both the "personal risks"
contributed by the employee, and the "employment risks" that the em-
ployee encounters in a particular job. As applied to heart cases, the
"actual risk" test would operate as follows:
If there is some personal causal contribution in the form of a
previously weakened or diseased heart, a heart attack would be
compensable only if the employment contribution takes the form
of an exertion greater than that of nonemployment life . . . . [If
there is no personal causal contribution, that is, if there is no
prior weakness or disease, any exertion connected with the em-
ployment and causally connected with the collapse as a matter
of medical fact would be adequate to satisfy the legal test of
causation.50
These suggested tests of legal causation, although certainly an im-
provement upon the "unusual strain" test, would still operate to exclude
compensation for many work-connected cardiac injuries, if only because
the tests are arbitrary in character. "Ordinary wear and tear of life"
may be a better standard than "unusual strain," but what is the
quantum of strain involved in the ordinary wear and tear of life? Can
it be stated in a precise standard of universal, national, or at least state-
wide validity? The board and the courts would probably have as much
difficulty in determining what is ordinary wear and tear as other juris-
dictions have had in determining what constitutes unusual strain.r"
Again, even though the "actual risk" test is much more sophisti-
cated than the "unusual strain" test, it still does not solve all the prob-
lems involved in heart cases. First of all, the problem remains of de-
termining what is or is not exertion greater than that of nonemployment
life. 2 Moreover, before the "actual risk" test can be applied, it must be
known whether or not a claimant suffered from a preexisting heart condi-
tion. While in the majority of cases the medical records will show a prior
history of heart trouble, in many cases they do not. In other words, a
preexisting heart condition may be asymptomatic, thereby making it
difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether there has been per-
Attack Cases].
50. Id.
51. New York, which utilizes the "wear and tear" test, has avoided defining the
norm of exertion constituting ordinary wear and tear of life. In each case it is found
as a matter of fact, without explanation, that the exertion involved was or was not
greater than the ordinary wear and tear of life. Thus, in its application, the "wear
and tear" standard, like the "unusual strain" test, will vary from case to case. For
example, the court may find that pitching leaves onto a truck requires exertion
greater than the ordinary wear and tear of life. Gibalski v. Elmira Country Club,
8 App. Div. 2d 883, 187 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1959). On the other hand, the court may
find that the overhead installation of electrical outlets and tubing while standing on a
ladder requires no more exertion than that needed to meet the ordinary wear and
tear of life. O'Brien v. Ronneberg, 8 App. Div. 2d 880, 186 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1959).
52. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
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sonal causal contribution. 53  In death cases, an autopsy would resolve
this problem, but not, of course, in cases where the heart attack was
only disabling.
Proposed Medical Tests
The adoption of minimum medical criteria for determining the
compensability of cardiac injuries has also been suggested.5" The impo-
sition of such criteria would operate to exclude compensation for heart
attacks which, from a medical standpoint, were not industrially caused.
To date, three states have taken this approach: Utah,55 Washington, 6
and Oklahoma. 57
The Utah plan establishes, for the various types of heart disease,
maximum time limitations within which symptoms of cardiac injury
must appear after the alleged precipitating exertion occurred. 58  For
example, in considering coronary thrombosis with myocardial infarc-
tion 5 9-the most frequent type of heart attack 0 -the Utah committee
report states that
[i]t seems reasonable to us to assume a probable relation between
the exertion and the coronary thrombosis with myocardial infarc-
tion if new symptoms . . . appear shortly after that exertion and
especially if such symptoms appear within one or two hours after
such exertion . . . . [W]here the first symptoms . . . appear
later than 12 hours after the exertion, it is our opinion that a causal
precipitating relation between the exertion and the coronary throm-
bosis with myocardial infarction would be improbable.61
Washington approached the subject in a similar manner, although
generally its criteria are more stringent than those recommended by the
Utah committee. To establish medical causality for coronary occlusion
53. See Heart Attack Cases, supra note 49, at 472-73.
54. CoMMIssioN REPORT, supra note 7, at 46.
55. Utah Heart Ass'n, Coronary Heart Disease and Utah Industrial Compensa-
tion, in H. MCNIECE, HEART DISEAsE AND THE LAW 576-78 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as Utah Report].
56. Committee on Trauma and Strain, Washington Heart Ass'n, Guide for
Establishing Causal Relationship Between Trauma or Strain and Heart Disease, in
Aronson, Effect of Effort on the Diseased Heart, 55 NORTHWEST MEDICnM 54 (Ian.
1956) [hereinafter cited as Washington Report].
57. Oklahoma Heart Ass'n, Report of the Cardiac-in-Industry Committee in
H. McNIEcE, HEART DIsEAsE AND THE LAw 46 (1961).
58. Utah Report, supra note 55, at 578.
59. This type of heart attack occurs when a portion of the heart muscle (myocar-
dium) is deprived of its blood supply due to the formation of a blood clot (thrombus)
in an arterial wall, thereby causing that part of the heart muscle to die (infarction).
For an excellent article which discusses in laymen's terms the working of the heart
and the nature of the common types of heart ailments, see Waugh, Physiology of the
Heart, 11 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 233 (1962).
60. AMERICAN HEART Ass'N, HEART FACTS 2 (PR-33, 1970).
61. Utah Report, supra note 55, at 577-78.
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with myocardial infarction,62 the first symptoms or signs must appear
"during or immediately following exertion or strain .... 1"63
Additionally, whereas the Utah committee took no stand on the
"unusual strain" issue,64 the Washington report stated flatly that for
medical causality to exist, the exertion or strain must be "both excessive
and unusual." 65  In other words, usual exertion should no longer be
considered a cause of disabling coronary disease. For the most part,
Washington's guidelines were adopted by Oklahoma.66
The prevalent criticisms of the utilization of minimum medical
criteria include the contention that, given the current conflict in medical
opinion surrounding the effect of exertion on the heart, any criterion
established would merely represent a compromise between opposing
views. Furthermore, many opponents assert that as medical research
progresses, any standard adopted would shortly become outdated.
Even medical certainty as to the causes of heart attacks may not elimi-
nate all the problems in this area. For example, suppose a worker, who
had enjoyed prior good health, suffered a heart attack immediately after
lifting an extremely heavy object. "The powerful suggestion of cause
and effect embodied in such a chain of events may hold too great an
attraction for a compensation referee . . . to be overcome even by
generally accepted medical principles which negate causation."69  Fi-
nally, it would be highly unjust to deny compensation for a cardiac epi-
sode clearly caused by the employment simply because the attack oc-
curred shortly after the recommended maximum time limit.
Other Proposals
Authorization to use written waivers of compensation benefits be-
fore employing persons with suspected heart conditions has also been
sought.7" The waiver would relieve an employer from liability should
the employee incur a heart attack in the performance of his work.
This suggestion is clearly repugnant to the basic purpose of work-
62. A thrombus is a form of occlusion. See note 59 supra.
63. Washington Report, supra note 56, at 68.
64. Utah Report, supra note 55, at 578.
65. Washington Report, supra note 56, at 69.
66. The medical criteria discussed in the text accompanying notes 58-65 supra
are utilized in an advisory capacity only. They are not the subject of statutes in
either Utah, Washington or Oklahoma. However, inasmuch as their utilization is
recommended by the Heart Association of each state, physicians called upon to testify
in workmen's compensation proceedings commonly apply them.
67. H. McNIEcE, HEART DISEASE AND THE LAW 118 (1961).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 312.
70. Letter from Christina J. New, Deputy City Attorney of Los Angeles, to the
Assembly Interim Committee on Finance and Insurance 4-5, Jan. 26, 1966.
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men's compensation, which is to compensate for all injuries arising out
of and in the course of employment."1 Even though an employee may
have had prior heart trouble, should employment subsequent thereto
aggravate his heart condition to the extent of disablement or death,
he ought to be awarded appropriate compensation. 2 In an early case,
the Washington Supreme Court stated that "it was not the legislative
purpose to limit the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to
only such persons as approximate physical perfection. '78  Apparently,
such was never the intent of the California legislature either, for waivers
are specifically prohibited by the Labor Code.74
The extreme solution of completely eliminating heart cases from
the scope of workmen's compensation has also been suggested, 75 and
has even been adopted by at least one jurisdiction.76 The following
proposed addition to the Labor Code, which, in substance, would
have the same effect, was recently introduced in the California Assem-
bly:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 3208,77 cardiac, cardio-
vascular, or circulatory disease shall not be held to be an injury
or to be caused or aggravated by the employment; provided, how-
ever, that disability or death due to aggravation of cardiac, cardio-
vascular or circulatory disease may be held to be an injury if
caused solely and exclusively by an extraordinary or unusual inci-
dent. .... 78
Such a provision, if enacted, 79 would successfully eliminate cardiac
claims from workmen's compensation inasmuch as the vast majority of
heart attacks involve preexisting disease. This proposal is open to the
same criticisms applicable to waivers.8 0
The imposition of arbitrary standards, whether legal, medical, or
otherwise, not only tends to defeat rather than fulfill the purpose of work-
men's compensation, but it diverts attention from the basic issue in-
volved--did the employment, in fact, causally contribute to the injury.
Although all arbitrary standards can be criticised on one ground or
another, it is recognized that in many situations they are necessary to
71. CAr. LABoR CODE § 3208.
72. See cases cited note 28 supra.
73. Metcalf v. Department of Labor and Indus., 68 Wash. 305, 309, 11 P.2d
821, 823 (1932).
74. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5000.
75. Letter from Christina J. New, Deputy Attorney of Los Angeles, to the
Assembly Interim Committee on Finance and Insurance 3, Jan. 26, 1966.
76. NEv. REv. STAT. §, 616.110(2) (1967).
77. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
78. AB 1157 (1969) (emphasis added).
79. The bill was referred to the Assembly Committee on Finance and Insurance,
but was never reported out.
80. See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
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enable a given law to perform its designated function. The question is,
therefore, does the present method of determining compensation
of heart attacks in California require the adoption of an arbitrary stand-
ard in order to satisfactorily accomplish the purpose of the compensa-
tion laws?
California's Approach
To reiterate, California does not require that an injury be acci-
dental in character; 8' nor does California legally require unusual strain
as a condition of compensability.82 As Larson, the author of the "actual
risk" test, points out, California differs from most jurisdictions in that
compensability of heart claims has long been fought on the fundamental
issue of causation alone.8" Proximate cause is a question of fact,84 as
is the weight to be accorded medical testimony.85 Whether the strain
is usual or unusual is only one of the facts involved.86 Thus, the trier of
fact is free from arbitrary absolutes in determining compensability.
This approach, contrary to the allegations of insurance carriers and em-
ployers, has not been manifestly unfair. A review of the statistics,
cases, and code provisions concerning cardiac disability or death do
not demonstrate the need to impose arbitrary standards.
Statistics
Statistics show that heart claims comprise only a small percentage
of the total number of claims under workmen's compensation. For the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1964, heart claims accounted for only 2.8
percent of the total original decisions issued by the board. 7 For fiscal
years 1965 through 1968, the respective percentages were 2.7, 2.9, 3.2
and 3.1 .8 The actual number of heart claims for each of those fiscal
years is as follows: 1964 - 1,191; 1965 - 1,219; 1966 - 1,334; 1967 -
1,620; 1968 - 1,656.89 These statistics certainly demonstrate that heart
claims are not as great a burden upon workmen's compensation as em-
ployers allege. The slight increase from year to year is compatible with
81. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
82. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 2d 555,
563, 166 P.2d 908, 913 (1946).
83. Heart Attack Cases, supra note 49, at 473.
84. Fontno v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 273 A.C.A. 741, 747, 78 Cal. Rptr.
291, 295 (1969); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 2d
555, 559, 166 P.2d 908, 911 (1946).
85. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 2d 555, 560,
166 P.2d 908, 911 (1946).
86. Id. at 563, 166 P.2d at 913.
87. LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 16.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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the annual increase in the California labor force ° and the growing
awareness by claimants of the developing law concerning heart in-
juries.9 1
Decisional Trends
An excellent review of the reported decisions involving heart dis-
orders, made by the legal staff of the State Compensation Insurance
Fund,9 2 illustrates numerous factual trends in California's approach to
determining the compensability of heart claims. On the whole, these
trends indicate that factually California has incorporated many of the
suggested standards urged by employers.
"Unusualness" an Important Factor
Although unusual employment-connected stress or strain is not a
mandatory requisite to secure compensation, its absence is a significant
factor in denying compensation. 3 In City and County of San Fran-
cisco v. Industrial Accident Commission,94 decedent incurred a heart
attack while cutting and removing a tree that had fallen across a drive-
way during a heavy storm. The court annulled an award of death
benefits, noting that
[i]t is true that the employee died immediately after per-
forming a task that was the most arduous of any required by his
employment. However, it is not a matter of common knowledge
that operating a cross-cut saw with a partner on the other end is
labor of such a strenuous type as to bring on a fatal heart attack.95
In Huff v. Petrolite Corp.,96 the denial of death benefits was af-
firmed by the board. Prior to his fatal heart attack, decedent had
worked during the day as a warehouseman for Petrolite, and at night as
a box boy for a department store. The board stated that although
decedent was quite busy on the night of the heart attack, there was no
90. For fiscal years 1965 through 1968, the total number of civilians employed
in California increased at an annual rate of approximately 3.8 percent. CALIFORNIA
DEP'T OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, REPORT ON ESTIMATED CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT, UN-
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR FORCE IN CALIFORNIA, 1940-1968, at 1 (Jan. 1969). For
those same fiscal years, the total number of claims before the board increased at an
average annual rate of 5.6 percent. LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 16. The number of
heart claims has also increased annually; but the ratio of heart claims to total workmen's
compensation claims has remained constant at 3 percent. See text accompanying note
88 supra.
91. COMIsSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 45.
92. E. CORTEN & S. ST. CLAIR, REPORT ON CURRENT APPELLATE RULINGS CON-
CERNING WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CLAIMS FOR DISABILITY OR DEATH ARISING OUT
OF CARDIAC CONDITIONS (1965) [hereinafter cited as CORTEN & ST. CLAIR].
93. Id. at 10.
94. 117 Cal. App. 2d 455, 256 P.2d 81 (1953).
95. Id. at 458, 256 P.2d at 83.
96. 32 Cal. Comp. Cases 117 (1966).
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evidence of unusual exertion. "His duties in the various employments
required considerable physical activity but could not be considered un-
usually strenuous."9
Conversely, the presence of unusual strain is often the decisive fac-
tor in the awarding of compensation. In Shelburne Refrigeration,
Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,98 decedent suffered a
heart attack allegedly precipitated by two lifting incidents. Within the
space of two days, decedent by himself replaced a compressor weighing
about 150 pounds, a job that normally requires two men, and also
helped a fellow employee lift a 200-250 pound air conditioner. While
the autopsy report conceded that the employment possibly caused the
fatal attack, the board felt that such strain was the probable cause
thereof, and accordingly awarded death benefits.99
Usual Strain
Of course, disability or death benefits have been awarded in cases
where unusual stress or strain was absent. In all such instances, how-
ever, there was "invariably substantial medical evidence to connect the
employment with the fatal or disabling heart disease."'100 This does
not mean that the medical evidence is slighted where unusual strain is
involved. What is meant, rather, is that from the viewpoint of the
layman, a heart attack that occurred during or immediately after strenu-
ous exertion in all probability must be causally related thereto. Con-
versely, employment causation is not readily apparent to the layman
where only usual exertion is present. In the latter situation, the referee
or board must of necessity rely heavily upon the medical evidence in
determining whether or not a heart attack was employment-connected.
For example, in City and County of San Francisco v. Industrial
Accident Commission,"' an ambulance steward suffered a heart attack
while unloading an oxygen tank in order to inspect it. He received
disability benefits even though removing the tank was part of his regular
duties. Particularly persuasive upon the commission was the testimony
97. Id. at 119; accord, Grace v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 20 Cal. Comp. Cases
247 (1955), wherein the commission reversed the referee's award of benefits to a butler-
chauffeur who allegedly suffered a disabling heart attack after lifting numerous pieces
of furniture in order to remove pads of paper from underneath them. Apparently, the
commission felt that little exertion was required to perform such work.
98. 31 Cal. Comp. Cases 125 (1966).
99. Accord, Smith v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 71 A.C. 609, 455 P.2d 822,
78 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1969), wherein the court reversed the board's denial of death bene-
fits. The court pointed out that the employer's medical examiner did not take into
consideration the strenuous nature of decedent's work (tree laborer) in reaching his
conclusion that there was no evidence of industrial causation.
100. CORTEN & ST. CLAIR, supra note 92, at 13.
101. 29 Cal. Comp. Cases 229 (1964).
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of an independent medical examiner, who concluded that "such exer-
tion even for one or two minutes might have been sufficient to have
induced some myocardial muscle necrosis . . . thereby initiating his
beginning infarction."'12
On the other hand, where the medical testimony does not sub-
stantially support work connection, and only usual exertion is involved,
compensation is normally denied. In Daniels v. Industrial Accident
Commission,'"° the appellate court affirmed the commission's denial of
death benefits. The decedent was employed as a "trouble shooter"
for an irrigation district. His regular duties occasionally involved the
climbing of poles in order to repair transformers, meters, and other
electrical facilities. On the day of his death, he suffered a heart attack
while climbing a pole for the third time. Initially, the commission
awarded death benefits upon medical testimony which, although con-
flicting, favored the conclusion that the heart attack was work-con-
nected. However, upon the motion of the insurance carrier, the com-
mission reconsidered the case, decedent's body was exhumed for a sec-
ond autopsy, and further medical testimony was taken. The new evi-
dence leaned in the opposite direction, and accordingly, the commission
annulled the previous award.'
Symptomatic Versus Asymptomatic
The presence or absence of symptoms prior to an alleged indus-
trially related heart condition is also an important consideration. 15
Thus, compensation is often denied where it is established that the em-
ployee's heart condition was symptomatic prior to the alleged industrial
102. Id. at 230; accord, Engineers, Ltd. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 22 Cal.
Comp. Cases 130 (1957), wherein disability benefits were awarded to a carpenter who
suffered a heart attack when lifting a steel shore weighing approximately 70 pounds.
His work normally involved such lifting; and it was conceded that the exertion on the
day of the attack was not unusual. However, the preponderance of the medical evi-
dence clearly established work connection.
103. 148 Cal. App. 2d 500, 306 P.2d 905 (1957).
104. Accord, Foster v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 136 Cal. App. 2d 812, 289 P.2d
253 (1955), wherein the denial of death benefits was also affirmed. Decedent, a
mechanic, suffered a heart attack while performing ordinary office work, which the
evidence indicated did not involve any emotional or physical strain. One physician,
who had treated decedent on several occasions, testified that, nevertheless, the work
and the circumstances under which it was performed causally contributed to the fatal
attack. Another physician, who submitted a report based upon a review of the testi-
mony, concluded that there was "no shred of evidence that [decedent's] job was in any
way responsible for his death." Id. at 814, 289 P.2d at 254. Obviously, the absence
of unusual strain helped persuade the commission to accept as decisive the "armchair"
physician's report.
105. CORTEN & ST. CLAm, supra note 92, at 20.
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injury. 1°, For example, in Paget v. Industrial Accident Commission,0 7
death benefits were denied to the widow of a hydraulic engineer who
suffered a fatal heart attack while driving a car in connection with his
work. It was noted that approximately a year before his death, the
decedent had complained of a dull pain in his chest. He was examined
at that time, and the physician made a diagnosis of myocarditis and
cardiac hyperthrophy °8
Conversely, where the evidence clearly indicates that the claimant
has had no prior symptoms of heart disease, his fatal or disabling attack
is often held to be employment-related.10 9 In Pacific Motor Trucking
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,"° the decedent, a truck driver,
apparently had a heart attack while trying to avoid driving into two
vehicles parked along the shoulder of the road. Death benefits were
awarded to his widow in light of the family physician's testimony that
decedent had no signs of heart disease, and statements from coem-
ployees that decedent appeared to be in excellent health and had never
complained of any heart trouble.
In Casualty Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,'
disability benefits were awarded to a linoleum salesman who suffered a
heart attack while lifting a 12-foot roll of linoleum. "Reports of the
doctors and the testimony of [claimant] himself indicated that . . . he
had never suffered any pain or had any trouble doing the work prior to
the [attack].""' 2
In summary, unusual physical or mental strain is one of the factors
present in the majority of successful heart claims. Where only usual
strain is involved, compensation will be denied unless there is sub-
stantial medical evidence showing causal connection between the em-
ployment and the injury. Moreover, where the heart condition is sym-
ptomatic, compensation is more likely to be denied.
Thus, the statistics, which demonstrate the relative insignificance
of heart claims upon workmen's compensation awards, and the de-
cisions, which reflect current application of compensation standards
sought legislatively by employers and insurance carriers, do not indi-
106. Id.
107. 20 Cal. Comp. Cases 262 (1955).
108. Accord, Camp v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 23 Cal. Comp. Cases 46 (1958),
wherein death benefits were also denied. Decedent, a business agent and secretary-
treasurer for a union, suffered a heart attack while under great physical and mental
stress from negotiating labor contracts. The medical records indicated, however, that
he had been in poor health, had weighed over 300 pounds, and had suffered from
arteriosclerotic heart disease.
109. CORTEN & ST. CLAIR, supra note 92, at 20.
110. 27 Cal. Comp. Cases 128 (1962).
111. 23 Cal. Comp. Cases 185 (1958).
112. Id.
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cate a need for the imposition of arbitrary legal or medical absolutes.
Statutory Provisions
The numerous statutory provisions affording protection to em-
ployers from excessive or unjust liability also rebut the alleged need
for arbitrary standards. For example, California Labor Code section
4663 provides that in cases of aggravation of any disease existing prior
to a compensable injury, "compensation shall be allowed only for the
proportion of the disability due to the aggravation of such prior disease
which is reasonably attributed to the injury." In other words, the em-
ployer is relieved of liability for that portion of the disability attributable
to the natural progression of preexisting disease.'
While it is true that this section does not provide for the similar
apportionment of death benefits, the absence thereof has not been an
unconscionable burden upon employers or insurance carriers. In fiscal
year 1968, death benefits were awarded in only 49 cases out of the 1,656
cases before the board." 4 Moreover, an employer may request that the
board order an autopsy in cases where there is reasonable doubt that an
employee died as the result of injuries sustained in the course of em-
ployment." 5 If the dependents of the decedent refuse to allow an
autopsy, a rebuttable presumption arises "that the injury or death was
not due to causes entitling the claimants to benefits. .... 6
Even where an employee obtains the right to disability compensa-
tion, the employer can require him to submit to periodic examinations
by a qualified physician in order to determine the current status of such
disability.:" 7 An employee's failure or refusal to submit to an exam-
ination, or his obstruction thereof, may suspend his right to commence
or continue any action for the payment of compensation." 8
The employer also has the right to effect a compromise and re-
lease agreement," 9 which, of course, must be approved by the board.2 0
Employers, as mentioned earlier, have taken advantage of this provi-
sion, but not, apparently, for the stated reason that work connection
113. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 238 Cal.
App. 2d 567, 48 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1965).
114. LABOR STATSTICS, supra note 16.
115. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5706.
116. Id. § 5707; see, e.g., Ottoson v. Union Lumber Co., 20 Cal. Comp. Cases 96
(1955).
117. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4050.
118. Id. § 4053; see, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
31 Cal. Comp. Cases 66 (1966).
119. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5000; see, e.g., Carmichael v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
234 Cal. App. 2d 311, 44 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1965).
120. CAr. LABOR CODE § 5001.
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was almost impossible to disprove.' 2' The basic motivation for seek-
ing a compromise appears to lie elsewhere:
Compensation settlements, unlike damage suit settlements, seldom
run into large figures, since there is no incentive for compromise
by the employer or insurer unless the sum to be paid falls within
the limits of compensation liability prescribed by statute. 22
Thus, it would seem that the vast majority of compromises are entered
into to avoid a probable award of maximum benefits. 2 3
Conclusion
To reiterate, neither the statistics, the decisions, nor the current
statutory provisions evidence the need for arbitrary legal or medical
standards. Given the medical uncertainties in the area of heart disease,
California's approach to compensation therefor has not been demon-
strably unfair. The present legal framework is well-suited for the assim-
ilation and application of new medical knowledge concerning the re-
lationship between employment and cardiac conditions. This is not to
say that there is no room for improvement, but only that the imposition
of arbitrary absolutes would be no improvement.
Admittedly, there have been instances where claims have been
compensated even though there was no manifestation of any strain,
usual or unusual, beyond that encountered in all normal activities.124
Such cases, though, have been rare. 12 5 The adoption of arbitrary stand-
ards would, of course, rule out compensation in those circumstances. At
the same time, however, compensation would be denied for a much
greater number of meritorious claims.
James A. Hudak*
121. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
122. 1 HANNA, supra note 20, § 8.02(4)(a).
123. California's "second injury law," viz., CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 4750-55, could
potentially operate to limit an employer's liability also, although to date it has had little
application to heart cases. In order to obtain compensation under CAL. LABOR CODE
§ 4751, the employee must show that prior to the occurrence of the subsequent indus-
trial injury, he had obtained the "factual status" of being "permanently partially dis-
abled." Ferguson v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 50 Cal. 2d 469, 479, 326 P.2d 145, 150
(1958). Inasmuch as preexisting disease of the heart is often asymptomatic, and in
most cases nondisabling, a claimant seldom qualifies for subsequent injury funds.
124. CORTEN & ST. CLAIR, supra note 92, at 17.
125. Id.
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